Peace and Stability in Afghanistan
The French military promotes self-sufficiency, civil-military cooperation and rural development
MAJ. GEN. BERNARD COMMINS/FRENCH SENIOR NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
Using military means alone, even if part of a global and powerful coalition of well-intended nations, is not enough to guarantee the peace and stability that national and local governments, as well as the population, expect after fighting ends.
In Afghanistan, our main concern is the local population, the standard of living in the aftermath of the war, and its enduring improvement from a long-term perspective. France has been a major contributor of troops to Afghanistan, and we have worked hard to bring peace and stability to the country. But there is still work to be done. To reach our goals, only a comprehensive approach — merging political, military, security, judicial, economic, social, education and administrative issues — can allow all the actors involved to see their efforts transformed into a comprehensive success that will benefit all.
A long-term perspective
The expeditionary force is nothing but a condition that has entered into the pattern of the local population’s life, and that will vanish, sooner or later. Consequently, even if the expeditionary force has its own missions, agendas, constraints and restraints, we have to see it through a larger lens and remember that we are just a part, or subelement, of all the challenges that are shaping the path from crisis to lasting stability.
The local population should receive some benefit from our presence and the changes it has brought to the country. Basic necessities (shelter, food and security) and other needs (education, job opportunities, administrative services, fair and balanced policing and justice) have to be provided for all the citizens, regardless of ethnic or religious affiliation. The national and local governments have to continue embracing these responsibilities.
Transferring responsibility
An expeditionary force does not have the means to conduct such stabilization efforts in the long term. These efforts must quickly be taken over by either national or local authorities. This has happened in parts of Afghanistan as military, government and local officials have taken the lead, but there is still much work to be done. If assessments show they are not reliable yet, another department (Ministry for Foreign Affairs or others) or any relevant international organization in charge of humanitarian relief or socio-economic development can contribute by lending its expertise.
It is of paramount importance to plan, coordinate and execute a detailed transfer of responsibilities from the expeditionary force to these organizations.
As part of the progressive handover of responsibility for security to Afghan National Security Forces, and to guarantee the endurance of the transition, districts and provinces engaged in the transition process have to be backed by the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF).
All the efforts, initially done by ISAF and then by international organizations, concerning the improvement of governance and the economy should be rewarded once these responsibilities are assumed by Afghans alone.
One example: agriculture
As far as the French experience is concerned, we could illustrate these ideas with the example of agricultural and rural development in Afghanistan.
At first sight, it might seem surprising that the military assumes responsibility for agriculture and rural development since it is not an operational priority. However, one has to remember that 85 percent of Afghans live in rural areas and that 80 percent are dependent on agriculture. Hence, any project in these fields might have direct consequences on the economy and might influence how well the foreign force is accepted and how successful the mission itself is.
By nature and by tradition, the Afghans rely heavily on agriculture and rural life. Even if it is not an operational priority, it became critical for ISAF, in order to win the support of the population. The government of France continues supporting this effort. One recent example: In 2014, the country pledged 10 million euros for Afghan agricultural development projects in Maidan Wardak and Bamyan provinces. The plan includes agricultural education and training for farmers.
The most numerous projects were linked to free distribution of seeds, beekeeping and insemination centers to renew livestock bloodlines.
Conclusions
The French experience in Afghanistan has led to certain conclusions for the future. There is a need to push the coordination between the armed forces and the agencies in charge of development to the maximum. This civil-military coordination is recommended for all stakeholders, as well as between Afghan military and police forces and civilian agencies. We must continue to work together to advance in this direction.
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