Decades of war and aggression have left a mark on Iraqi citizens
Professor DR. QASSIM HUSSEIN SALIH FOUNDER AND PRESIDENT OF THE IRAQI PSYCHOLOGICAL SOCIETY
Generations of Iraqis — at least for the past 34 years — have experienced terrorism, sectarianism and economic conflict. A culture of violence started to prevail among Iraqis in 1980, and an instinct for aggression began to rise in the collective subconscious of the people. The Iraq-Iran war (1980-1988) was not limited to the organized army. It militarized the people in what was called the People’s Army. Every Iraqi family housed a soldier, a member of the People’s Army formations, internal security forces or a member of the special security agencies. This meant that children in that period experienced their fathers carrying Kalashnikovs, tanks on the streets, shocking scenes of carnage, the loss of homes or relatives, as well as images of battles and human corpses shown daily on a television news broadcast called Images from the Battlefield. Describing the impacts of war and violence on youth requires a scientific analysis of the personality broken down into three components: behavior, ideas and emotions.
The reduced emphasis on the value of life in the early 1980s damaged Iraqi youth at the time. Iraqis became accustomed to seeing coffins and large numbers of victims that reached hundreds every day after 1982. Children began to perceive the world as aggressive and the use of violence as the only means for survival.
The disappearance of fathers on the battlefield created weak discipline among children left without authority figures. The weak role of schools in providing guidance and counseling eroded morals. And gun usage among children rose as society, including even university professors, was militarized for eight years from 1980 to 1988.
Those eight years of war impacted the formation of children’s behavioral, cognitive and emotional states. Just a year after the war ended, Iraq entered into another catastrophic war when the former regime under the late Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, a rare historical example of a country entering into a catastrophic war immediately after emerging from another. This had the effect of reinforcing the culture of violence in generations of teens in the 1990s who had begun their childhoods in the violent 1980s.
From 1990 to 2003, the United Nations Security Council’s trade and economic embargos on Iraq ended up increasing violence. Robberies increased, and car hijackings accompanied by killings were common. In two studies we conducted — the first on the inmates of Abu Ghraib prison and the second on a gang of six people — we found that economic factors inspired criminality, and revenge was the main cause for violence by the gang members. A view among Iraqi youth that the world is hostile and unjust has led to the use of violence as a means of survival. Even today, destruction, killing and fighting have become a normal pattern of daily life rather than an anomaly.
This leads to the conclusion that the sectarian strife that Iraqis witnessed between 2006 and 2008, and the current on-going violence, may not have happened in such an ugly manner had not the highest percentage of fighters been composed of the very youth who had witnessed war and violence in the 1980s.
After the fall of the regime in April 2003, some Iraqis continued living in a state of violence. The first psychological transformation that happened to Iraqis following the mood of joy that spread when they were rid of dictatorship can be described by the following theory: If the state collapses, law is disrupted and life becomes chaotic, fear prevails among people, who will then scatter into groups. Individuals will be controlled by the need to survive and will seek out powerful groups to protect them based on the principal of mutual obligations.
This reality leads to another social psychological theory that we describe as follows: When societal loyalties forcibly break down, people fight among themselves for power in the absence of a strong state or system.
The change in 2003 brought with it further complications. From 1921 to 2003, power was in the hands of Sunni Arabs and suddenly, without democratic preparation or a smooth transition, there was an exchange in roles in which Shiite Arabs took on more power. The psychological effect of this change resembled the exchange of roles between a master and slave. This reality is explained by the following theory: A society that has two large sects, where one acquires power with the help of external force and the other is subjected to political, economic and psychological frustration, creates sectarian strife.
Successive disappointments that Iraqi youth encountered caused a state of ideological and existential confusion. Those who believed that democracy would come smoothly and quickly after the country’s release from dictatorship were disappointed to see further turmoil. Some of the politicians elected to fulfill the dreams of the Iraqi people instead acted corruptly once they assumed office. Meanwhile, youth experienced problems, such as standing on the street every morning looking for jobs despite having earned university degrees. Others suffered from mental illnesses: depression, despair, social isolation, hatred and alienation. In addition, two phenomena spread: increased incidents of divorce and drug abuse among adolescents and youth in particular.
Failure to manage power well in Iraq during the years after the change weakened national identity and loyalty to the homeland. Identities and loyalties toward the homeland also varied within a state of tribal, sectarian and nationalistic intolerance, contradicting what youth considered to be the essence of democracy. This all occurred amid a sense of dissatisfaction, a prevailing culture of hatred, disintegration of social ties and strained family relationships.
This description does not apply to all Iraqi youth. There are large segments, including the sons of academics, intellectuals, artists and democrats, who enjoy good psychological health and legitimate aspirations. But most of them are not politically active. Since the future of Iraq lies in the hands of youths, its leaders will be among those currently engaged in political action and those who were born during the 1980s and raised on a culture of violence, mental illness, political paranoia, and sectarian and ethnic intolerance.
This means that the future of Iraq is endangered unless practical measures are taken based on scientific analysis.
Based on the fact that values are what identify goals and guide behaviors, we must emphasize a strategy to promote a culture of peace and support youth by providing jobs and equality.
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