DEFEATING Da’ish Online

An analysis of Da’ish propaganda helps counter terrorist ideology

In the propaganda that Da’ish issues for global consumption, the terrorist group posts images of mass executions of innocents, the destruction of historical treasures and the sexual enslavement of women. The goal of these Internet videos is to outrage and intimidate opponents.

But in trying to build its brand with fellow extremists, Da’ish’s propagandists enlist more subtle methods of image manipulation. The majority of this propaganda is meant to bolster claims of building a caliphate, the religiously ordained utopian community it is supposedly building in Iraq and Syria. This propaganda portrays Da’ish functionaries operating government ministries, courts, schools and charities.

In designing and implementing a communications and media strategy to defeat Da’ish, merely denouncing its latest atrocities will not be enough. Many believe the grisly videos are partly designed to divert attention from the softer messaging that Da’ish has used more effectively to recruit supporters.

The multinational coalition against Da’ish will need to acknowledge these other narratives — and shape its messaging strategies to counter them.

“All too often, the consensus is that brutality is the extent of Islamic State propaganda. This is simply not the case. The full spectrum of its political messaging is vast,” noted a July 2015 report by the Quilliam Foundation, founded by Maajid Nawaz, Ed Husain and Rashad Zaman Ali, former members of the extremist group Hizb at-Tahrir. “Besides brutality, it is preoccupied with mercy, victimhood, belonging, militarism and, of course, apocalyptic utopianism.”

Da’ish media strategy

The Internet videos show bearded men going on fishing trips, tending sheep and paving roads. It’s perhaps surprising to learn this is an international terrorist group trying to portray its practical side. After all, this is the same Da’ish that has shown no hesitation in saturating the Internet with broadcasts of mass executions.

But it’s all part of the terror group’s well-financed media strategy. Da’ish has borrowed techniques from the world of business and marketing in an attempt to establish a globally recognizable brand. Da’ish doesn’t make and broadcast all the material itself, but relies on sympathizers around the world to spread a message that consists of several key elements:

Brutality: By highlighting violence meted out to its supposed adversaries, Da’ish develops a supremacy narrative of fighters exacting revenge as representatives of Sunni Islam.

Victimhood: Da’ish tries to justify its brutality by showing war damage wrought by its enemies, claiming that the damage was an attack on Sunni Islam itself.

Mercy: This narrative shows Da’ish opponents such as Syrian soldiers converting to the cause of their former enemies, suggesting submission to Da’ish is preferable to death.

War: This propaganda highlights Da’ish fighters’ activities on the battlefield and the military hardware they have looted from their enemies.

Belonging: This is an attempt to attract new recruits by emphasizing a sense of joy and brotherhood among Da’ish fighters in Iraq and Syria living under the group’s misguided interpretation of Sharia.

Utopianism: This narrative describes everyday life in the “caliphate” as idyllic and a fulfillment of God’s wishes. The rhetoric includes talk of a “day of judgment” and the end of the world.

The authors of the Quilliam report stress that counterradicalization strategies that focus too much on Da’ish’s violent rhetoric often overlook the more subtle messaging meant to aid Da’ish recruitment.

“Propaganda that focuses on everyday life in the ‘caliphate’ rarely makes it into the mainstream press due to its subject matter; disengaged publics are not interested in Islamic State’s administrative efforts. Often, this content is left wholly ignored, even though it is just as important as violence when it comes to the brand,” the report said.

Counternarrative strategy 

Terrorists groups of an earlier era rarely approached the complexity of Da’ish media messaging. The Internet has provided modern terrorists with a vast multilingual media platform unavailable to earlier violent extremists. So, any counterstrategy must likewise work online to blunt Da’ish’s appeal to fellow extremists.

“All security agencies must join efforts to combat Da’ish trying to recruit youth via social media,” His Royal Highness Saudi Prince Turki Al-Faisal, chairman of the King Faisal Foundation, said in an address to Arab ambassadors in September 2015.

But what strategy should the anti-Da’ish coalition use? Rashad Hussain, United States special envoy for strategic counterterrorism communications, suggests most of the countermessaging comes from trusted voices in the Arab world and match Da’ish’s propaganda theme for theme. This communication strategy can’t limit itself simply to attacking Da’ish’s actions but must also confront the twisted ideology sustaining Da’ish.

In an approach advocated by Hussain, the strategy would include five complementary components: amplifying Islamic responses to reduce recruitment, “de-glamorizing” Da’ish, highlighting the experiences of former radicals and Muslim victims of Da’ish, promoting positive counternarratives and maintaining a strong regional online presence.

As Hussain noted during a speech in Abu Dhabi: “If terrorists are calling people to a path they call righteous and holy, we have to be clear that the terrorist path is blasphemous and prohibited. If they claim to be defending Islam and Muslims, we have to illustrate vividly how they are destroying Muslim communities. And if terrorists are trying to convince young people that they’ll be joining a winning team, we have to convince their targets that they will be joining a losing one.”

Leaders such as Her Royal Highness of Jordan Queen Rania Al Abdullah said countering Da’ish’s propaganda is crucial to bringing peace.

While there is a military effort to defeat Da’ish, Muslims must do more on the ideological front, she said during a conference in Paris focused on youth in August 2015. “We’re not actively helping Da’ish, but we’re not actively stopping them either. And we can’t stand against them until we, as Muslims, agree on what we stand for … and how we tackle this extremist ideology growing on the fringes of our peaceful, compassionate faith.”

Hundreds of Muslim scholars have condemned Da’ish’s crimes, ruling that the organization is not Islamic, not a state and not a caliphate. But that message needs to be disseminated creatively online to provide potential Da’ish recruits with a compelling reason to watch. In some cases, counternarratives could show youths expressing their grievances through humanitarian works instead of violence.

The views of former fighters 

An important part of countering Da’ish’s media campaign is testimony from former Da’ish fighters who abandoned the group. Criticism from former insiders demolishes Da’ish’s image of solidarity, highlights hypocrisies among the leadership and weakens future recruitment. The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political Violence examined the experiences of 58 Da’ish defectors, about half from the Middle East, and identified four strong narrative threads that ran through their complaints.

First, former fighters complained that, despite promises they would defend embattled Sunnis against the Assad regime in Syria, they ended up killing other Sunni rebels. Da’ish leadership was obsessed with infighting — killing “spies” and “traitors” in the movement — rather than attacking Da’ish’s supposed non-Sunni enemies.

A second complaint dealt with Da’ish brutalization of innocent civilians. Massacres, hostage taking and theft were routine. That brutality also extended to Da’ish fighters executed by their own commanders.

“The defectors’ voices are strong and clear: Da’ish is not protecting Muslims. It is killing them,” the report said.

Former recruits also highlighted corruption as a reason for their disaffection. Da’ish “emirs” would steal and treat fighters unfairly. Recruits said they were given degrading tasks, including an Indian recruit forced to clean toilets because of his darker skin.

Last, fighters initially motivated by a desire for adventure and material gain found their experiences in Syria disappointing. Quality of life in their camps was poor, and their duties as fighters largely dull. The life of a terrorist didn’t live up to the promises of the recruitment propaganda.

Conclusion

Experts emphasize that the first step to effective countermessaging is demystifying Da’ish’s propaganda. It’s important to realize that Da’ish’s videos and photographs, by themselves, are not enough to motivate a person to travel to Syria.

For that to happen, a human influencer — a family member, friend or authority figure — must act as intermediary. Propaganda’s role consists of sharpening would-be recruits’ already-held radical views.

“It is only after we have achieved an understanding of the motivations and objectives that drive the Islamic State media machine that we can begin to challenge it effectively,” Quilliam’s Haras Rafiq said. “How, for example, can we be expected to develop a counternarrative without knowing what narratives we are countering?”