An expert from the United Arab Emirates examines methods to defeat terrorism in the Middle East
DR. EBTESAM AL KETBI/PRESIDENT OF THE EMIRATES POLICY CENTER
Photo by EMIRATES POLICY CENTER FOR Strategic STUDIES AND RESEARCH
In one month in 2014, terrorist attacks resulted in 5,042 casualties. The Global Terrorism Index that year predicted a nightmare scenario of expanded terrorist networks building new breeding and recruitment grounds in various parts of the world and employing new and hybrid models combining proxy wars, state fragmentation and cyber wars.
This underscores the need for a scientific analysis and deconstruction of the hierarchal and operational structure of terrorist networks, militias and unorganized terrorism.
First, we must analyze terrorist networks that have adopted the caliphate ideology since their emergence in the early 20th century and their evolution into the so-called Da’ish. It will examine the networks and their historical development, whether in the form of nonstate actors or hybrid actors.
While nonstate actors have tried to take over the nation state by using force inside fragile or failing states and preying on them (as al-Qaida has done), hybrid terrorist networks have also tried to control parts of a crumbling state, depending on military, human and funding capabilities and acting as expansionist states. This latter model is embodied by Da’ish for almost a year in Iraq and Syria.
Second, the discussion should focus on militias as another dimension of the current phenomenon. The militias are supported by larger regional actors within a parallel track of the caliphate ideology, which is consolidated and entrenched in certain nations. Two particular models come to the fore here: militias limited to militant activities and offshoots of political parties taking part or not taking part in state institutions.
Third, unorganized terrorism networks and their activities and implications need to be discussed. Unorganized terrorism is generally meant to connote terrorist activities not springing from harmonious organizational or intellectual backgrounds, even though they might express, in rare cases, tendencies and objectives of terrorist networks.
The model of the “outraged” is an embodiment of one aspect of unorganized terrorism. It represents terrorist reactions carried out by individuals out of nonideological motivations. These reactions might sometimes emerge as a result of psychological-pathological cases or social pressure that have found in terrorist behavior an easy means of salvation.
The other aspect of unorganized terrorism is what is known as the “lone wolf” model, launched for the first time by al-Qaida’s former leader Osama bin Laden and revived later by Da’ish leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. This model draws on the network’s investment in breeding loyalty, loyalty to the network and its ideology.
A lone wolf does not require organizational connection or advanced skills as much as it depends on loyalty to the ideology and core values revered by the terrorist network and the ability to attack specific targets by using the minimum means and tools of killing and destruction available. International reports highlight that lone wolf terrorist attacks represented 25 percent of all terrorist attacks all over the world between 2005 and 2014.
Spread of Terrorist Organizations: Strength and Weakness
The spread of terrorist organizations is linked to countries suffering from a lack of basic functions of nation states. Therefore, these groups have not flourished as a consequence of their capabilities only, but as a result of struggles and failed policies of nation states.
In the wake of the Arab Spring, extremist movements exploited the failure, fragility and the regression of state authority in countries of the Middle East and North Africa region and intensified their activities. The trend has led to the creation of a “jihadist triangle” in North African countries with vertices in Tunisia, Algeria and Libya, and another one in the Levant with bases in Iraq and Syria, Yemen and Egypt.
In recent years, terrorist groups have undergone qualitative developments. While al-Qaida sought to fight the “far enemy,” Da’ish is following a different strategy by controlling regions and declaring the establishment of a caliphate.
Strategies of geographic spread adopted by Da’ish are governed by limitations such as the extent of central control over the targeted region and its population, the availability of funding, its symbolic and strategic value, change of the balance of power in favor of adversaries, and the need for tactical shifts in operations.
Da’ish seeks to control new areas through three stages: an “exhaustion” phase by transforming the area into a failing one, a “management of savagery” phase in which it commits violence, and an “empowerment” phase in which it asserts more control.
Likewise, the lone wolf phenomenon has initiated a new phase in the threat of global terrorism. Social media and the Internet facilitated the rise of this trend. The media are also a pillar in the strategy of extremist and terrorist organizations. By using modern technology proficiently, Da’ish, for instance, has succeeded in attracting thousands of foreign fighters and frightening its opponents.
The relatively large numbers of European Muslim youth who joined terrorist groups or became lone wolves is evidence of the failure of integration policies in Western countries and the inability of Islamic institutions to create a model of European Islam. According to statistics, 90 percent of these jihadists were recruited through the Internet.
Recommendations
Here is a list of recommendations that can aid the battle against terrorism:
Regional countries, in cooperation with the international community, must agree on a procedural definition of “terrorism” and “terrorist movements” and create a unified list of terrorist groups. I offer the experience of my country, the United Arab Emirates, as a model.
The military campaign against terrorist organizations must be accompanied by comprehensive strategies.
Countries must take measures to prevent terrorists and fighters from traveling abroad. Countries neighboring hot spots must boost their security arrangements to prevent terrorist infiltration across borders.
Instead of targeting individuals/fighters in terrorist groups, countries must focus on terrorist leaders/generals.
Intellectual efforts to combat terrorism must not be limited to official apparatus; instead, all segments of society must take part.
Public and private media outlets must draft a charter on how to portray the actions of terrorist groups and how to handle the material they broadcast.
Countries must develop tools of cyber war to combat online propaganda by terrorist organizations.
Financial transfers should be monitored in countries where terrorist organizations exist, and nations should disrupt illegitimate transactions in oil, antiquities and gold in these hot spots.
All countries must draft a unified policy on how to deal with kidnappings and ransoms demanded by terrorist groups.
Jails must be placed under intelligence surveillance to avoid becoming breeding grounds for terrorists. Prisoners who complete their sentences must undergo a long-term monitoring program.
Arabian Gulf states should enhance national feelings among their Shiite minorities, encourage Sunni religious reform toward peaceful coexistence with Shiite beliefs, and prevent any extremist attempt to exploit Sunni-Shiite differences.
The ideologies of the Sunni caliphate and their Shiite equivalents must be studied, deconstructed and dealt with as fundamental sources of terrorism threatening global stability and peace.
About the author: Dr. Ebtesam Al Ketbi is a founder and president of the Emirates Policy Center and a professor of political science at UAE University. She earned a
Ph.D in political science at the faculty of economics and political sciences, Cairo University. She is board member of several organizations, including the Saudi-supported Arabic Thought Foundation.