Springtime for Youth

Four main factors drove youth to instigate the Arab Spring

IAN GARNER, WILLIAM GOODYEAR, JEFFREY PAYNE, KIP WHITTINGTON, MICHAEL WILLIAMS, NEAR EAST SOUTH ASIA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

The Arab Spring challenged many assumptions among analysts and policymakers about the Middle East and North Africa. One crucial set of assumptions concerned the Arab youth population. Before the Arab Spring, youth were either marginalized by policymakers, who considered them to be too disorganized and disinterested to be important players in the political process, or treated as an impending threat, a monolithic bloc destined to be radicalized by extremist movements. Yet, if the Arab Spring demonstrated anything, it is that youth populations are highly unpredictable and extremely difficult to characterize.

Arab youth populations both shaped and were shaped by the Arab Spring. They reacted to their initial victories in a multitude of ways and pulled their countries in widely different directions. Still, there were a few common issues that all Arab youth populations confronted throughout the Arab revolutions. Four key themes either drove or challenged the youth at the revolutionary moment. These themes were democratization, socio-economics, radicalization and culture.

Democratization

The presence of a large youth cohort affects the progression and stability of democratization. Although youth populations tend to support democratic institutions, their penchant for political change contributes to conflict and instability. In other words, youth can initiate democratic reform but also destroy the progression of democratic institutions.

One possible reason for this is the tendency for ideology to influence large youth populations. This was particularly the case in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. In Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen and other countries throughout the region, young activists adopted new and sometimes radical political ideologies. The frustrated desires of this large youth population for participation in the political process aided acceptance of new political methodologies. Their base of operations became the street, their structures populist in orientation and their commitment directed toward altering the status quo. Since the youth in these countries were focused on gaining access to the political process, they expressed a general (though not monolithic) preference for democratic political arrangements.   

Unsurprisingly, highly mobilized and ideologically motivated youth populations can pose serious threats to governmental stability. If the regime is not strong or flexible enough to withstand these challenges, it risks political reorganization (as in Tunisia) or even societal breakdown (as in Syria).

The case of Egypt is illustrative. Seventy percent of its population is under 34, and, after wavering back and forth during the Hosni Mubarak era, Egyptian birthrates soared in 2012 to 32 for every 1,000 people, a reversion to the rate reported in 1991.

Socio-Economics

Youths are a crucial segment of the labor force, and ensuring they are employed and self-sufficient is critical to ensuring socio-economic stability in a country. The MENA region historically has a poor record of providing for these populations. Highly educated youths graduated from school only to face stagnant economies and shrinking job markets. About 87 percent of Egypt’s unemployed are between the ages of 15 and 29. Even oil-rich Gulf countries faced serious youth unemployment crises.

A large youth population with low job prospects and ample free time correlates highly with radicalism and street protest. In the past, countries of the MENA region have pursued government-subsidized employment to combat these problems. However, this model can no longer sustain the sheer size of current youth populations amid less-than-stellar national economic performance. Energy subsidies in the region are particularly massive, accounting for about half the world’s spending of that type. Instead, countries get trapped in vicious cycles in which the government cannot afford to pay for subsidies or employment, but cannot rid itself of such policies for fear of provoking more protests and rioting.

For example, demographics alone cannot explain the instability shaking places such as Egypt. But it is clear that Egypt’s demographic distortions, as well as its economic malaise, have been a key factor in the advent of the initial revolt as well as the continued unrest.

Radicalization

Do youth bulges tend toward extremism? The answer is unclear. Before the Arab Spring, conventional wisdom dictated that unemployment and alienation would drive young men, in particular, toward illicit activities and extremism. In the 2006 study, “A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence,” Henrik Urdal explored the alleged correlation, concluding that “relatively large youth cohorts are associated with a significantly increased risk of domestic armed conflict, terrorism, and riots/demonstrations.” Additional causes triggering violence include “social advancement, ambition and yearning for respectability,” according to social scientist Gunnar Heinsohn.

Yet, the relative lack of violence throughout the Arab Spring — with the major exceptions of Syria and recent events in Egypt — seems to contradict these theories.

Some analysts dismissed the notion of the youth bulge as a “ticking time bomb.” Stephanie Schwartz, author of Youth and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Agents of Change, argued that “the way in which these movements emerged was through widespread, decentralized grassroots participation” consisting of a broad mix of young people with “different interests and goals.”

The commitment of young Arabs to peaceful demonstration, even in the face of repressive violence, undermined the legitimacy of the extremist claim that political change in the Arab world could only come through violence.   

While large youth movements may not result in immediate violence, it is clear that extremists target disaffected, underemployed youth to carry out their bidding. Youths who are underemployed or unemployed continuously fill the ranks of terrorist organizations who offer payment for loyalty.

Culture

In the MENA region, the youth bulge impacts society culturally on many levels. For young people ages 15 to 29, one primary grievance, according to University of Minnesota professor Ragui Assaad, is their inability to “turn their education into productive jobs.” Youth bulges are present in other regions, such as Southeast Asia, but what makes the bulge so particularly powerful in Arab countries is a lack of market opportunities for young adults. In Egypt, unemployment among college graduates is ten times that of non-college graduates.

According to George Mason University professor Jack Goldstone, a rapid upsurge in higher education before the English and French revolutions led many to question governmental authority when people failed to find employment they deemed appropriate to their status.

This pattern was repeated in the MENA region throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, particularly among women, who outnumber their male counterparts in universities in two-thirds of Middle Eastern countries, the United Nations reported. According to Hafez Ghanem of the Brookings Institution, “female labor force participation rates are only around 25 percent.” Undoubtedly, this disparity between educational attainment and employment promoted female participation in revolutionary movements. 

In a region with a strong cultural tendency toward deference to elders, youth often feel marginalized in a political process dominated by older members of society. At the same time, the cultural premium that Arab societies place on education exacerbated social tensions as this highly educated youth population faced shrinking economic opportunities. This was particularly the case with women, further fracturing societies. A key challenge for the rising youth population in the MENA region will be how to reconcile their ideas, desires and aspirations with the cultural norms of their societies.

Conclusion

As the Arab Spring continues to unfold, the Arab youth population will likely continue to be a major driver of change in the democratization, socio-economics, radicalization and culture of the MENA region. Although the ways in which this population enacts change will vary greatly among countries, these themes appear to be the most relevant to the youth of the region and will most likely be sources of political mobilization and coalescence.

Authors’ note: The views expressed in this article do not represent the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.

Sources: “A Clash of Generations? Youth Bulges and Political Violence,” Henrik Urdal, International Studies Quarterly, 2006, Volume 50, No. 3607-629; “A Growing Gulf: Public and Private Sector Initiatives and the Realities of Youth Employment Outcomes,” Gulf Research Center workshop, University of Cambridge; “After the Spring: Inclusive Growth in the Arab World,” Hafez Ghanem, Brookings Institution, January 2013; “The Battle of the ‘Youth Bulge,’ ” Lionel Beehner, Council on Foreign Relations, April 2007; “Demographics of Arab Protests,” interview with Ragui Assaad, professor, Humphrey School of Public Affairs, University of Minnesota, Council on Foreign Relations, February 2011; “Half a Chance: Youth Bulges and Transitions to Liberal Democracy,” Richard P. Cincotta, Issue 13, 2008-2009, Wilson Center, Environmental Change and Security Program Report; “Middle East and North Africa: Defining the Road Ahead,” and “Energy Subsidies in the Middle East and North Africa: Lessons for Reform,” Middle East and Central Asia Department, International Monetary Fund; “Mideast Women Beat Men in Education, Lose Out at Work,” Catriona Davies, CNN, June 2012; “The Politics of Youth Bulge: From Islamic Activism to Democratic Reform in the Middle East and North Africa,” Leila Austin, SAIS Review of International Affairs, Vol. XXXI, No. 2 (Summer-Fall 2011); “Seismic Shift: Understanding Change in the Middle East,” Henry L. Stimson Center, May 2011; U.S. Agency for International Development; “Youth and the ‘Arab Spring,’ ” Stephanie Schwartz, U.S. Institute of Peace, April 2011.

Youthful Discontent Fuels the Syrian Civil War

IAN GARNER, WILLIAM GOODYEAR, JEFFREY PAYNE, KIP WHITTINGTON, MICHAEL WILLIAMS/NEAR EAST SOUTH ASIA CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES

The revolutions throughout the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are regularly characterized within the media and government as the result of widespread radicalism throughout the region. Certainly, conducting a revolution is a radical act enacted by those with uncompromising ideas. But one can’t forget that each revolution within MENA occurred only after citizens tried, and failed, to achieve moderate reforms. This was the case in Syria.

The first signs of instability appeared in the spring of 2011, when activists, most of them young, took to the streets with calls for greater political freedom and economic opportunities. These demonstrations, grass-roots oriented and decentralized, were received by President Bashar al-Assad’s regime with violence. Dominated by the Alawite minority, the regime governed a diverse population that had risen up before.

These moderate protests, partly inspired by the revolutions in North Africa, were viewed as a potential threat to the Assad regime. It moved quickly and with great force to silence them. The government succeeded in stopping the demonstrators, but the violence only served to inspire others to protest the regime. As the regime met further dissent with violence, public opinion turned against the government. Furthermore, the failure of moderate calls for reform dissuaded activists from appealing to the government. Instead, they took the more drastic step of supporting the overthrow of the Assad regime.

The early activists involved in the Syrian uprising were young. As was the case in most of the countries within the MENA region, Syria’s youth demographic was disproportionately large. This segment of society was more educated than previous generations, it was most likely to be unemployed, and it was the most willing to seek change, given its financial situation and unfamiliarity with the horrors of earlier uprisings. They were not inherently radical, and their early activities provide evidence for this. But Syrian youth were impatient — impatient about lack of jobs, lack of political outlets and general lack of options. The regime’s resort to violence encouraged youth to shift their methods. What the early stages of the uprising reveal is that no single factor started the civil war. It was a volatile combination of ingredients that set off the conflict.

Economics, Politics and Youth

The effects of the Syrian civil war have spilled into neighboring countries and increased tensions throughout the Levant. Lebanon, already a divided state, has seen violence increase from Syrian refugees, fighters crossing the border and heightened sectarian tensions. Turkey’s long border with Syria is used as a conduit for refugees fleeing the war and for equipment intended for the opposition. Until recently, Iraq had not been drawn into the war to any great extent, but that changed in 2013 as refugees, mainly Kurdish, entered Iraq’s northern provinces. To the south, Jordan’s already large refugee population has swelled with new arrivals from Syria converging on displaced persons camps.

As of late 2013, the civil war had claimed the lives of 100,000 Syrians. Such an outcome could be seen as surprising. Before the conflict, Assad’s regime appeared to enjoy general popularity, and there were few visible signs of a desire for political change within Syria. What the past several years suggests is that rulers must pay greater attention to the mixture of economics, politics and demographics.

Syria’s civil war is partially the result of political and economic deficiencies. The country’s youth had done what was expected of them — they earned an education. Yet, the Syrian economy stood largely apart from the global economy and could not absorb a youth cohort of such an immense size. Young people that could leave did so. Those who stayed tried to influence public policy, specifically seeking to loosen restrictions on political mobilization and to implement programs to boost economic opportunity. The government’s violent response effectively blocked the political route to reform. Many of Syria’s youth became radicalized and took up arms with rebel groups. The unfortunate result of this saga is that a large segment of a rising generation will likely be lost amid the violence.

With the conflict between the regime and opposition groups raging for more than two years, the Syrian youth movement has undergone a series of transformations. Activists initially hopeful about political reform in Syria have all but disappeared and many have been pushed into armed conflict. Unfortunately, as the conflict has continued, Syria’s youth have become more desperate and more likely to join the most radical armed opposition groups. The moderate, reform-minded youth activists of 2011 have been replaced by extremist, sectarian young fighters.

Conclusion

The civil war poses a number of important challenges to strategists, chief among them the necessity of drawing the correct lessons from the conflict. One should never assume that the conflict was the result of an inherent tendency among Syrian youth to radicalize. Instead, analysts of the Syrian conflict and strategic thinkers would do well to focus on the ways in which the conflict developed and intensified over time as the opposition reacted and adapted to regime tactics.

It is only in this context that the full tragedy of Syria can be understood. A once promising generation is turning to radicalism and violence, a generation that has already surprised strategic thinkers around the world. Leaders risk surprise and further unrest if they continue to ignore this unpredictable and restless generation.

Authors’ note: The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not represent the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the U.S. government.