Multinational efforts can help counter threats
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Failing and failed states provide a serious danger to international security as well as to the welfare of their citizens. On the international level, they have the potential of becoming safe grounds for terrorist organizations, creating a base for criminal activities such as drug, arms and human trafficking. On a regional level, they can destabilize neighboring countries. Domestically, these states cannot provide essential and basic services for their populations, which generates insecurity and poverty.
These consequences of failed states have fueled concerns in the international community for the past decade. One event that drove the world to approach this phenomenon more seriously was the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, D.C., in the United States. These terrorist attacks clearly illustrated how the failure of a state thousands of miles away can easily impact the security of any country in the world, even if it is one of the most powerful countries, as in the case of the U.S.
Failed or weak states are key contributors to breaches of human rights. Populations are deprived of education, health care, housing and, most importantly, security. The absence of security leads to mayhem and disorder, exposing countries to ethnic clashes, civil wars or genocides.
These facts have driven the United Nations and international and regional organizations responsible for security, human rights, and humanitarian and development assistance to prioritize solutions and measures to tackle this phenomenon. The Fund for Peace has released the Failed States Index 2011, which labels countries according to their levels of stability — alert, warning, moderate and sustainable. In the alert category and at the top of the list comes Somalia, and at 13th place comes Yemen. These two countries present security and economic challenges to the international community, the region and the Gulf states. The Gulf is significant for the world economy, making stability in this region crucial for many countries around the world.
Al-Qaida and al-Shabab
In general, there are similarities between Yemen and Somalia. Both societies are tribal and socially conservative. They have difficulty providing consistent government services. Both Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the Somali militia group al-Shabab have exploited the weakness of the two countries to their benefit. It is undeniable that the “stateless” condition in Somalia is not relevant to Yemen. Nevertheless, AQAP has benefited from weak central government control in southern Yemen.
Both terrorist organizations have established themselves in areas they control using the same methods: They start by focusing on gaining support of the local population. They provide services to people in an attempt to make themselves an alternative to the weak central governments. These terrorist organizations attracted foreign fighters to join them, especially from Iraq and Afghanistan, by providing safe havens. Most importantly, they have recently started to share the same ideology. This was evident in February 2012, when al-Qaida’s most influential figure, Ayman al-Zawahri, announced the merger of al-Shabab and al-Qaida. Moreover, AQAP will be able to use Somalia to conduct training and planning and as a logistics base from which they can smuggle weapons and fighters to the Arabian Peninsula. With the absence of strong government in places such as Somalia, such a prospect is highly likely. If even one shoreline of the Gulf of Aden were to fall into al-Shabab or AQAP control, it would be cause for great concern. If the contact between al-Shabab and AQAP were to evolve into cooperation, with the possibility of enabling them to launch and plan attacks on ships passing through the Gulf of Aden, the threat could become even more significant. Both organizations are far from blind to the opportunities that would be available to them as a result of close cooperation.
Furthermore, with the significant availability of low-cost, low-weight guided weapons, small enough to be launched from a small craft, the security implications are even more serious. It is estimated that thousands of Somali refugees escape to Yemen every year, providing AQAP and al-Shabab with opportunities to hide and smuggle fighters and weapons to and from each country. They are also able, with the help of piracy, to generate profits from human trafficking, profits that can be used to finance operations.
The recent al-Shabab attack at a mall in Nairobi, Kenya, that killed more than 60 civilians in September 2013 is a bleak example of the terrorist organization’s reach outside Somali borders.
What can be done? International and regional actors are not helpless. By adopting helpful measures and policies in the realms of politics, economic development, institution building and security, they can minimize the negative impact from Yemen and Somalia as weak states.
Strengthening Yemen
The Yemeni government is making strides with regional and international actors, especially the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and the U.S., to stabilize the country. The creation of the Friends of Yemen group at a donor conference in London in January 2010, regrouping GCC states, the United States, Britain, Germany and a number of international organizations, is a significant step in the direction of dealing with and resolving the implication of Yemen as a weak state. The National Dialogue, which began in Yemen in early 2013 is another step in the right direction as leaders in the country try to resolve problems and return stability. However, there is more to be done. Here are some specific solutions:
Yemen is in significant need of more development assistance. Yemen, as a state, has always been a low priority on the list of donors. In 2005, it received $335 million in assistance, which formed 2.2 percent of its gross domestic product, which was obviously not enough to tackle the many issues the government faces. However, after a December 2009 failed terrorist attack, a number of countries announced an increase in assistance. Sadly, some of what countries promised to provide was never delivered.
Significant effort should also be paid to building institutions, especially focusing on building up the government’s competency and ability to deliver basic public services. Thus, investing heavily in education and health care is important and will lead to the government gaining legitimate status among the population. To make this happen, Yemen must demand both financial and technical support from donors, with firm conditions in place to protect against corruption.
Furthermore, Yemeni officials and donors should work together to find ways and means to improve the performance of the Yemeni economy — for example, by tackling water shortages. GCC countries have invested heavily in desalination plants to provide sufficient fresh water. This solution would be hugely expensive for Yemeni officials to maintain in the long term because it requires large amounts of money. However, this would be the only possible solution to the problem because underground water cannot be relied on to fulfil the fresh water demands of such a large population. The Yemeni government should invest in a “post-oil economy,” use aid to improve its fishing and tourism industries and take advantage of the country’s strategic location by transforming its southern ports into a hub for international and regional maritime trade passing through the Gulf of Aden.
Political reform is also essential to improve the country’s capacity to face current challenges. The National Dialogue is a major step toward achieving reform, and success will have a positive impact on the country.
Equally important is continued regional and international cooperation. Some suggest the effort be directed toward the following areas: Yemen’s capacity in counterterrorism, military cooperation and intelligence exchanges. By gradually increasing the Yemeni forces’ capacity to deal with terrorists, Yemen will eventually succeed in winning the fight against al-Qaida. Military-to-military cooperation in training and exchanges with international and regional players can help achieve this. By agreeing to intelligence and information exchanges with neighboring countries, Yemen will more effectively counter criminals and terrorists trying to use the country to their advantage.
Border security is an area where international military cooperation is essential. Enabling the Yemeni central government to secure its own national border should be a priority. This must be done in coordination with other regional partners, including Saudi Arabia and Oman.
Stabilizing Somalia
Strategies to mitigate problems arising from instability in Somalia must also be employed, especially relating to maritime threats. Multinational maritime task forces help protect international aid and work as a deterrent against Somali pirates in these waters. This international effort could be part of the solution, but it cannot be the only solution. Moreover, deploying forces to counter piracy at sea does not address the root causes of the problem on land. The international community has established a large number of incentives to try to find appropriate measures to tackle the roots of Somali piracy.
One immediate solution to the problem of Somali piracy would be a well-trained and well-equipped Somali Coast Guard. This could be achieved in two steps. The first step requires the international community and regional players to provide private companies to work as a coast guard for Somalia or by deploying their forces to do the same job. It is undeniable that this process would require huge coordination. Regional players such as the African Union and the Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, could deploy and task its countries’ members’ coast guards to operate on the coast of Somalia.
Another immediate solution to Somali piracy would be focusing on and targeting the pirates’ leaders and disrupting the piracy network in the area. This could be achieved by the disruption of the pirates’ supply networks, especially those supplying weapons, fuel, outboard motors, skiffs and other equipment. Intelligence exchanges between players in the region would help achieve this goal.
The only visible long-term solution to Somali-based piracy focuses on state and institution building within Somalia and encouraging a strong central government with adequate forces to reduce threats. Somali-based terrorism is as complex as the problem of Somali piracy. To reduce the threat of terrorism, international and regional players need to adapt a more holistic approach to resolving the problem. Al-Shabab, as the main terrorist actor in Somalia, should be the main target of the international and regional effort, but the problem should not be dealt with by military means alone. The international and regional effort should follow three main lines to deal with al-Shabab’s threat in Somalia — political, economic and military.
Conclusion
The phenomenon of weak or failed states greatly concerns the international community. What has been fueling such concern is that these countries have become the main cause of regional and international instability. Failed or weak states become attractive destinations for terrorists and criminals.
The international and regional reaction to the security and economic challenges of Yemen, as a weak state, and Somalia, as a failed state, needs to be coordinated and directed toward confronting the roots of the problem. The international community needs to focus on the causes, not just the symptoms. For example, Somali-based piracy is a symptom of Somalia as a failed state, not a cause of its failure. By truly addressing these issues, the two countries will face these challenges more effectively and productively. Stabilizing Yemen and Somalia will not only benefit citizens of those countries but will also bring greater stability and prosperity to the region.
Sources: “The Merger of Al-Shabab and Qaidat al-Jihad,” by Nelly Lahoud, Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel at West Point; “States at Risk and Failed States, Putting Security First” by Marina Ottaway and Stefan Mair, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; “State failure in Africa: causes, consequences and responses,” by Paul D. Williams, www.europaworld.com; “Somalia and Yemen: The links between Terrorism and State Failure,” Ioannis Mantzikos, Digest of Middle East Studies; “Somalia Piracy, Why Should We Care,” by Martin N. Murphy, RUSI Journal; Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; “Yemen on the Brink: Implication for U.S. Policy,” by Christopher Boucek, U.S. Congressional Testimony, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; “Yemen: Prospect for State Failure – Implications and Remedies,” by Thomas Juneau, Middle East Policy Council
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