Taming Yemen’s turbulent youth bulge requires a multinational commitment to education and economics
Professor Murad Alazzany/Sanaa University and Professor Robert Sharp/Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies
Yemen’s Pink Revolution began in 2011 and led to a series of substantial changes. The origins of the revolution consisted mostly of popular economic, political and security grievances. Protesters fed on the spirit of change emanating from Tunisia and rose up to plead for worthwhile jobs, decent housing and the right to grow up in a stable and safe country where they could build a better future for their families after years of repression. Many of the protesters naively believed that their sacrifice would lead to a more settled country where justice and equality would be assured.
Yemen’s political progress is impressive, and some offer it as a model for transitioning Arab Spring countries. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiated an agreement for Yemen — signed in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on September 12, 2011 — that provided an implementation mechanism for the bloodless leadership transition process in Yemen. It led former President Ali Abdullah Saleh to surrender power to new President Abd-Rabu Mansour Hadi. A National Dialogue Conference concluded in early 2014, followed by the writing of a new Yemeni Constitution, a referendum, and new presidential and parliamentary elections. Recently, the Yemeni government has focused on security because al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) has used the disruptions of the transition to mount unfettered operations from Yemen’s ungoverned spaces and has encouraged the Houthis to infiltrate the outskirts of Sanaa to clash with government security forces. The growing power vacuum has pitted Yemenis against Yemenis and created a struggle among political parties.
After three turbulent revolutionary years, the crucial question remains: Have the sacrifices, hopes and dreams of the protesters been fulfilled? While the government understandably concentrates its effort on security reform, it has yet to truly wrestle with a depressingly long series of humanitarian crises, in particular a chronic youth bulge that threatens what is one of the poorest countries in the Arab region.
Growth rate stresses
Almost three-quarters of Yemenis are under 30 years old. Although large numbers of working-age people can be an asset, the youth bulge in Yemen has aggravated pre-existing political and socio-economic stresses. With a growth rate of 2.5 percent annually in Yemen — where women have an average of five to six children — the population is expected to increase from 24 million to 35 million by 2025, twice the regional average.
So far, the government — dealing with limited resources because oil reserves are running out, deteriorating security is preventing oil exploration, and saboteurs are attacking and cutting pipelines — has failed to create enough jobs to meet growing demand. Oil and gas revenue represents about a third of the gross domestic product, almost two-thirds of government revenues and 90 percent of exports.
Yemen’s unemployment rate doubled from 14.6 percent in 2010 to 29 percent in 2011. Unemployment has intensified since 1991, when large numbers of Yemeni workers were repatriated from Gulf states following the first Gulf War and former President Saleh’s support of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Up to 2 million workers originally from rural areas were forced to return to Yemen, stretching already stressed infrastructure for jobs, schools, health care and other basic social services. The government was unable to absorb them, and some argue that the influx of unexpected and unemployed people triggered an economic downturn that ultimately led to the civil war of 1994.
Today, traditional opportunities for youth migration within the region appear to have declined significantly. This situation is exacerbated by growing annual university enrollment, up from 35,000 in 1991 to nearly 300,000 in 2010 and the follow-on high rates of unemployment among young graduates. Yemeni workers are generally pessimistic, and unconfirmed reports suggest that as many as 60 percent of college graduates are unemployed. As Yemen recovers from its political transition and the economy grows, the public sector, financed by the state, is the preferred option for Yemen’s young graduates. Although complete and credible statistics are unavailable, it appears there has been some progress with paying new public sector employees, which is encouraging. Whether the government can cope with the growing demand for these types of jobs is the big question, and the situation is compounded by a similar scarcity of jobs in the private sector.
For the foreseeable future, the youth bulge will continue to pose a direct threat to Yemen’s stability and also create problems for local, regional and global security. Many link social unrest to the youth bulge: Disenfranchised, unemployed and discontented youth are a perfect breeding ground for AQAP, radicalization and general lawlessness. This is particularly true because many unemployed youth have nothing better to do than be paid thugs for the highest bidder, irrespective of the paymaster’s agenda. They can be drawn into the political arena and recruited as demonstrators for a relatively low price. Providing guns, meals and money as a way to build status among unemployed and disadvantaged youth means AQAP presents an attractive alternative lifestyle. Terrorists can even tempt the uneducated — and the educated living in poverty — into suicide bombing. The gravity of the problem is amplified if other factors preventing Yemen’s full development are taken into account: illiteracy rates of at least 25 percent among 15- to 24-year-olds, a poverty rate of 54 percent, malnutrition among 58 percent of Yemen’s children, and an increase in preventable diseases.
Ideas for a better future
Yemen clearly needs updated and responsible family planning education and support for government policies. At the national level, whole-of-government coordinated and synchronized actions including participation of the ministries of Health and Education must be developed to curb the forecasted population explosion. We suggest a national campaign, led by a senior female politician or, if so motivated, the wives of the president and/or prime minister. Family planning is vital to ensure progress, and in Yemen it is woefully inadequate. Half of Yemeni women use no form of family planning.
We suggest updating the 2006-2015 Yemeni National Youth and Children Strategy, based on input from the recently concluded National Dialogue Conference, and raise it to the level of a national presidential initiative. Education provides many solutions, but Yemen has only about 30 colleges and universities, despite the increased demand. We suggest the formation of an Emergency Educational Reform Committee chaired by the prime minister to address the educational crisis at the national level for prioritization and resourcing to shape education to prepare youth for achievable jobs. That would include a shift toward critical thinking and analysis and away from more traditional and outmoded forms of learning.
We propose a national campaign to promote the “New Yemen” among youth, using a hand-picked group of credible voices and celebrities to communicate a positive message. If Yemen’s youth see an alternative future through hope, education and employment, they can be effectively deterred from a future of radicalization and violence and, more importantly, to recognize the difference through modern educational approaches.
Greater coordination is required between the public and private sectors to better tailor educational programs to labor demands. We suggest a standing ministerial policy level committee on job stimulation co-chaired by the minister of education. The prime minister would select a private sector equivalent co-chair and annually brief the parliament and the president.
Economic growth in Yemen requires international support, and we assume that existing pressure will continue to be applied to international donors, especially the GCC, to support Yemen. But we recommend that donations and payments be linked directly to reasonable progress on the ground in Yemen as reflected in credible metrics. That would help focus policymakers and reduce donor fatigue. An opportunity exists for jobs through neighboring countries, and in particular, through the GCC. Yemenis have traditionally been a source of low-skilled workers to the GCC, particularly in construction and agriculture. Yemenis should be provided international visas and permits to work in GCC countries. International pressure and support is necessary to encourage the GCC and Yemen’s neighbors to outsource jobs to Yemen’s youth. The predicted enormous growth of youth must be managed if further destabilizing conditions are to be avoided.
Allowing Yemen to join the GCC as a full or associate member is a logical step and will attract much needed investment. It would benefit Yemen and its youth with jobs and benefit the GCC by filling lesser skilled jobs with a ready supply of qualified Yemenis. We suggest Yemen’s president garner support from neighbors and propose actions to secure Yemen’s GCC membership.
There may also be some employment options to the south, focusing on East Africa and using the proposed Bridge of the Horns, which would connect Yemen with Djibouti over the Bab al-Mandeb strait. We suggest Yemen’s minister of foreign affairs actively examine options for employment of Yemenis in African states.
Yemen’s youth bulge is a strategic threat that must be addressed now and through Yemeni whole-of-government actions with the support of international actors. It is not going to be easy, and the problem is not going away by itself. Sensible policies drawn up now and appropriate measures taken today can help shape Yemen’s future.
Sources: The Washington Post, The New York Times, BBC, Al Jazeera, Yemen Times, Foreign Policy, World Bank, National Yemen, the United Nations, UNICEF, Frontline, IRIN, Open Democracy, CIA Factbook, Index Mundi, Hiiraan Online
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Murad Alazzany is an associate professor at Sanaa University, Yemen. Robert Sharp is an associate professor at the U.S. National Defense University, Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies, Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this article are the authors’ alone and do not represent the official policy or position of Sanaa University, the U.S. National Defense University, the U.S. Department of Defense or the U.S. or Yemeni governments.
Comments are closed.