Successful counterterrorism programs in Muslim-majority countries often employ similar approaches
By: PROFESSOR HAMED EL-SAID/GUEST AUTHOR
We still don’t know as much as we think we do about radicalization, counterradicalization and deradicalization processes and programs. We are also, by extension, still ignorant of the ideal recipe of successful counterradicalization and deradicalization programs (counter/derad), and even of how to measure the effectiveness of our efforts in this area of research and practice.
Chief among the causes of our ignorance is that counter/derad programs remain the exception and not the rule. Most United Nations member states follow an approach based on a long tradition of a “hard” military formula of killing first and then capturing “terrorists.” Still, several studies have investigated counter/derad programs, and it is this genuine, multidisciplinary and good quality research that holds promise to overcome our lack of knowledge.
“Soft” counter/derad policies have grown in stature and influence during the 12 years since the September 11, 2001, attacks, which prompted a “war on terror” that yielded an unprecedented kinetic global response. Though counter/derad programs are by no means fully tested, remain incomplete and insufficiently evaluated at this stage, they will continue to gain momentum because they hold the only hope for completely defeating terror. Research will continue to focus on counter/derad applications and implications, and evidence will continue to pile up until their value cannot be denied.
What We Know and Don’t Know
We have not even been able to reach a unified agreement over the definition of terms such as radicalization, violent extremism (VE), terrorism, counterradicalization and deradicalization. These terms now mean everything to everybody. Their definition depends on the definer, analyzer of the subject phenomenon, and the cognitive views of the observer and his/her political orientations, if not loyalties and outright biases. The truth is that research itself has been biased in favor of “dropouts”: factors that encourage radicals to repent or leave terrorism behind – in other words, deradicalization. Root causes of terrorism have largely been ignored.
It was only after the Madrid and London terrorism attacks in 2004 and 2005, respectively, that the language was modified to allow researchers to work on the conditions conducive to radicalization and extremism that lead to terrorism. These terminologies were first introduced by the European Union around 2005 before being adopted by the U.N., following the E.U.’s introduction of the 2006 Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, which was adopted unanimously by all members.
Conditions for Radicalization and VE
Studies focusing on root causes or conditions conducive to radicalization and extremism that lead to terrorism have tended to emphasize the individual nature of the problem. The only agreement that exists today among observers and experts in this area is the acknowledgement of social networks/environments as a crucial driver in drawing vulnerable young people to a terrorist movement. These networks include family, friends and relatives. Most people also concede that radicalization is a process rather than an event. Yet, the drivers and triggers of the radicalization process are vast and cannot be easily encapsulated.
Our own fieldwork in more than 18 Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority states also confirms that the presence of a large number of push and pull factors can lead to radicalization and VE at micro-personal, national/local, and global environment levels. These findings suggest that for any hopeful understanding of the conditions conducive to radicalization and VE, the current micro-individual approach must be broadened and extended to include not only personal factors (personal suffering, personal traumas, loss of a relative or a friend, deprivation, unemployment), but also the policies of national and foreign governments that can sometimes lead to radicalization through the impact on economic conditions, equity, job creation, treatment of ethnic minorities and other factors.
Counterradicalization and Deradicalization Programs
There is a growing opinion today that the general approach to countering terrorism is insufficient and may sometimes do more harm than good. The emergence of more innovative approaches, ones that rely more on soft responses and seek to win the hearts and minds of the most vulnerable sections of the population, have called into question some of the hard, and traditionally military, approaches to countering terrorism. These soft approaches, despite their limited number and relatively recent introduction, have been “deemed more successful than military approaches and less likely to foment a new generation of violent extremists,” a 2010 report by the New York-based think tank International Peace Institute concluded.
A survey carried out by the author and published in 2008 by the U.N. Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force showed that 34 member states were engaged in implementing some form of soft counterradicalization (preventive efforts that sought to stem the rise of radicalization in society) and deradicalization programs (efforts whose main objective was to persuade those who have already committed or attempted to commit VE acts to repent and rejoin society). Since 2008, the list of countries has grown a little more, with Sudan, Mauritania, Nigeria, Australia and Turkey, to mention a few examples, joining in and incorporating soft policies as an integral part of their counterradicalization and counter-VE efforts.
The survey focused on what exactly these countries mean by soft policies and what exactly they contained. In that sense, the survey was extremely valuable in shedding light on the main components of counter/derad programs and what the official security circles now call “best practices.” The results of the 2008 survey have been supported and complemented by the findings of two other large projects, which the author has carried out since then. The outcome of this work suggests a list of best practices, some of which follow:
Religious rehabilitation: This was the most common element in the programs studied. Most countries believe that ideology is central to, or at least used to justify, violence or as a “license to kill.” Hence, the majority of countries introduced a religious rehabilitation program to delegitimize violence, correct misinterpretation of religious texts and promote moderate Islam. Religious rehabilitation was introduced both inside and outside prison walls.
Education/career support: Most countries did not rely on religious rehabilitation alone. In fact, most programs incorporate less religious, more secular elements. Education is an example. A large number of detainees either lacked education or spent long periods in detention, becoming out of touch with the needs of the labor market. Secular educational rehabilitation programs were introduced to educate those who lacked education and train those who lacked the up-to-date skills needed in the local market. Most detainees accused of VE charges — more than 100,000 worldwide — will be released at some point. Education is the best way to prepare them to rejoin society.
Family rehabilitation: The role of social and familial networks in radicalizing and recruiting individuals is well-established. Involving families in the deradicalization program, particularly when detainees come from a Muslim background (given the strong attachment Muslims pay to family relations generally), has proven effective in facilitating repentance and at the same time reducing recidivism. If a person returns to a radical environment after release, it can undermine all pre-release efforts. Therefore, designing an effective family rehabilitation program to ensure that families themselves are not radical and are aware of radicalization dangers is vital. Saudi Arabia leads efforts in this regard.
Civil society programs: The state alone does not have all the resources required to counter radicalization, especially in recalcitrant parts of the country. Countries that have sought to involve their dynamic and vibrant societies in their counterradicalization efforts have proved to be far more successful than those that did not.
Post-program care and monitoring: It is not easy for former detainees to rejoin society. This task is even more difficult for detainees charged with or convicted of VE, given the nature of the charge and the stigmatization that is often attached to such crimes. This requires a strong after-care program to facilitate the return of former detainees to nonradical lives, families and labor markets. The Saudi government directly intervened to offer guarantees to former employers to reinstall repentant detainees to their former jobs or even find new ones for them.
Physical education, art and competition: Empirical evidence shows a strong correlation between good health, happiness and exercise. Healthier and happier detainees respond better to deradicalization programs. Several governments have incorporated physical activities as an important part of their busy and well-structured deradicalization programs. In addition to adding physical education, Saudi Arabia has introduced an interesting art program to allow detainees to express emotions and ideas through art.
Prison conditions and human rights: Many prisons are characterized by overcrowding, gang networks and crime, drug problems, smuggling and corruption of detention administration. Prisons are rife with vulnerabilities. Prisons characterized by such features have facilitated radicalization and the spread of VE. Countries that took serious measures to reduce such vulnerabilities, including improving human rights, have experienced better results.
Staff training: This is a vital step, since most staffers, while hardworking and committed, often lack training in Islamic culture and religion, the radicalization process, and signs and indicators of radicalization. Staff often mistake and confuse religious expressions (such as praying or even conversion) with signs and indicators of radicalization. Such mistakes can undermine even the best-designed programs. In the area of staff training, Turkey leads other countries studied in this field.
Key Challenges to Counter/derad: the Sydney Memorandum
Some of the chief challenges faced by countries when they attempt to design and implement counter/derad programs were noted in the Sydney Memorandum. It was based on the South East Asia Capacity Building Working Group’s workshop on prison management in Sydney in November 2012, which was attended by more than 15 country representatives from the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Europe and the United States.
The workshop and resulting memorandum focused on how management of the prison environment could help detainees transition back into their societies and families after release. The memorandum provides important clues about challenges faced by countries attempting to rehabilitate violent extremism detainees, and it identifies reasons why various programs have not succeeded in some Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority states. The memorandum was adopted by the U.N. Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force in December 2012.
The memorandum also classifies obstacles faced by counter/derad officials into two main types: internal (obstacles inside the prison walls) and external (obstacles outside the prison walls). Internal obstacles include seven key challenges: prison overcrowding, failure to segregate violent extremists from other inmates, manipulation and corruption of prison staff, inability to ensure the safety of prison staff and their families, lack of staff training, difficulty in evaluating success, and resistance to engagement and participation by detainees themselves.
External obstacles include five key challenges: community rejection and suspicion of official efforts, lack of political will and constant political interventions in counter/derad programs, lack of support from nongovernmental and human rights organizations, negative media coverage, and stigmatization of detainees and Muslim communities stemming from the way governments implement such programs, making it harder to reintegrate former detainees into their society.
The challenges reflected in the Sydney Memorandum warrant attention. Overcoming these challenges can go a long way toward improving the effectiveness of counter/derad programs in the Middle East and elsewhere, enhancing the chances of success as well as reducing the risk of failure.
Conclusion
Despite their increased popularity, counter/derad programs remain the exception, not the rule. The majority of U.N. member states have not yet incorporated these programs into counterterrorism strategies. This undermines the ability to evaluate such programs, identify conditions conducive to their success or failure and develop a framework to guide policymakers in designing and implementing such programs.
Most studies have also relied on small, unrepresentative samples to draw indecisive conclusions. Governments, moreover, continue to monopolize information and data on their counter/derad efforts and have often tended to exaggerate successes and minimize failures. What is certain, however, is that no one size fits all and that success has often depended on the presence of political will, a politically and developmentally strong state, trustful state-society relations and the support of each countries’ rich social capital, mores, traditions and values.
But despite their small number, counter/derad programs have often been viewed as more successful than strictly military approaches. They are not only much cheaper and less costly than traditional military approaches but are more likely to win hearts and minds, reduce the level of threats, enhance state-society relations and save lives.
Author’s note: Research for the story benefited from a larger project on counterradicalization and deradicalization programs in United Nations’ member states financed by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
About the author: A Jordanian by birth, Hamed El-Said is chair and professor of international business and political economy at Manchester Metropolitan University Business School in the United Kingdom. He is advisor to the United Nations Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force, a position in which he has analyzed counterradicalization and deradicalization programs of member states to identify best practices. He also advises the Arab Thought Forum, founded and chaired by Prince Hassan bin Talal of Jordan. El-Said was a well-known figure in the game of squash, representing his home country of Jordan in international competitions from 1981 to 1993.
Sparking Religious Dialogue
New center can undercut extremism by promoting tolerance
UNIPATH STAFF
Since leaders from the world’s major religions gathered in Vienna to inaugurate the King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue, the Saudi-funded organization has moved into its permanent home, hired key staff and begun to tackle its momentous mission.
That mission includes empowering and encouraging dialogue among followers of different religions and cultures around the world, ultimately encouraging tolerance and peace to counter extremism. The center touts itself as an “independent, autonomous, international organization, free of political or economic influence.”
At the center’s inauguration in November 2012, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal warned against extremists who seek to “propagate notions of intolerance, exclusion, racism and hatred.”
“These tiny minorities,” he said, “are trying to hijack and disrupt the legitimate identities and aspirations of people of all cultures and faiths.”
Also speaking at the inauguration was United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who noted that the center can play a vital mission in countering extremism.
“Too many religious leaders have stoked intolerance, supported extremism and propagated hate. … Yet we know that blaming ‘the other’ is not a political strategy for a healthy country, continent or world.
“Religious leaders have immense influence. They can be powerful forces for cooperation and learning. They can set an example of interfaith dialogue,” the secretary-general said.
Saudi Arabia pledged up to $79 million to establish the center and pay for its first three years of operation. Spain and Austria are listed with Saudi Arabia as the “Council of Parties” responsible for overseeing its work. The Vatican is a “Founding Observer” of the center.
The Board of Directors consists of high-level representatives of the major world religions — three Christians, three Muslims, a Jew, a Buddhist and a Hindu.
The center is headed by Secretary-General Faisal bin Abdulrahman bin Muaammar of Saudi Arabia. Although the center was launched by Riyadh, it is not a Saudi entity, bin Muaammar stressed.
“This is an international institution,” he told The Associated Press. “About 70 percent of the world’s religions are on its board. The center will be a neutral place to exchange ideas.”
The center has started initial work in three fields, according to The Associated Press:
— Its “Image of the Other” program has experts study how other faiths are portrayed in their media and education, with an eye to improving schoolbooks and public perceptions.
— A fellowship program brings young religious leaders together for three to four months in Vienna to study selected issues and learn how each faith deals with them.
— A UNICEF program invites religious leaders in Africa to support health projects for children that militants sometimes sabotage by telling people their religion forbids them.
Comments are closed.