Fighting Terror with Information

Disasters, both natural and man-made, are the theme of a multinational exercise

UNIPATH STAFF

As if the government of Kazakhstan didn’t have enough work tending to hundreds of thousands of earthquake and flood victims, a mysterious terror group started blowing up chemical plants and trains, hijacking relief convoys and spreading disinformation to an already distressed population.

For many of the Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Afghan and Tajik officers at a Regional Coordination Center overseeing the disaster response, the first impulse was to summon their best troops and remove the physical threat posed by the self-styled Asian Unification Brigade (AUB).

But organizers of Regional Cooperation 2013, U.S. Central Command’s annual military exercise held this time in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany, deliberately left trainees without the authority to engage terrorists in combat. If they were to respond to the AUB, they would have to do so with messaging campaigns via television, radio, computers and print publications.

RC 13 represented the first time in 10 years that exercise organizers formed an Information Operations Group to counteract terrorist propaganda entwined in the fictional scenarios. (The past nine exercises had focused mostly on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.) As a military discipline, counterpropaganda operations are well-developed in some Central Asian countries and less so in others. But such multimedia tactics have become increasingly vital to defeating the enemy.

“In the exercise, we learn how to manage issues we didn’t know how to manage before. In our country, it’s good to have a group that can counteract terrorists without resorting to force,” said Col. Saydullo Dodokhonov, a Tajikistan senior officer attending the computer-assisted exercise. “Terrorists are well-equipped these days. We need to be ready. Terrorism is a disease of the 21st century. We should — we must — cooperate to stop it.”

A coordinated response
Occupying three stories of a building at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies from July 8-18, 2013, the exercise brought together dozens of officers from Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Afghanistan and the United States. English, Russian and Dari linguists provided instantaneous translations to integrate the multinational units. Maps, slides, intelligence reports and instruction manuals appeared in all three languages.

Kazakhstan served as lead nation, providing senior military officers to command cells at the Regional Coordination Center set up in the aftermath of a fictional magnitude-8 earthquake in its capital of “Almaly.” In addition to the counterpropaganda group, RC 13 included cells to plan and coordinate disaster relief operations, gather intelligence and conduct public affairs. Presiding over the endeavor was an executive group staffed by the highest ranking officers in attendance from each nation.

The earthquake, accompanied by landslides and dam breaks, was the initial catastrophe that set the exercise in motion, killing and injuring 200,000 people. Exercise controllers magnified the mayhem so that any one nation couldn’t handle it alone, forcing Kazakhstan to rely on neighboring countries and international organizations for relief.

Requests for blood donations, medicine, blankets, purified water, search and rescue teams and earth-moving equipment went out to Afghanistan, Tajikistan, the Kyrgyz Republic, NATO, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the U.S. Agency for International Development. The United States repaired radar at Almaly’s international airport so that supplies could arrive from collection points such as Manas Air Base in the Kyrgyz Republic.

Combating terror without guns
But just as the Regional Coordination Center was grappling with the initial casualties, another disaster struck. A car bomb ignited the “Zarat” ammonia plant, spewing a 35-square-kilometer toxic cloud that killed 11,600 people and forced the evacuation of 164,000.

Intelligence percolating into the Regional Coordination Center noted that Afghan Soldiers had discovered a small scale model of the same chemical plant at an AUB camp in Afghanistan. Kyrgyz border guards had discovered weapons being smuggled with relief supplies destined for Kazakhstan. Websites collecting donations for earthquake victims were disrupted by hackers. Kazakh police had raided what appeared to be an improvised explosive device factory.

The conclusion was inescapable: The AUB was fomenting turmoil in an attempt to weaken the Kazakh government.

“The city has been destroyed extensively, and somebody is taking advantage of the situation. They are trying to destabilize the situation to show the government is failing to execute its duties. They are involved in propaganda and organizing terror acts and intimidating people,” explained Kazakh Col. Pavel Kovalenku.

The Information Operations Group flew into action. Although the AUB denied responsibility for the chemical explosion, international news organizations blamed the terrorists for the attack. The information group’s commander, Kazakh Lt. Col. Abay Abdullayev, gave his cell 2½ hours to report back with suggestions on how to counter AUB propaganda that claimed the Kazakh government “continues to bring chaos and despair to the people.”

Abdullayev delegated responsibilities by nation. The Afghans would serve as propaganda intelligence analysts. The Tajiks would focus on audio-visual production, and the Kazakhs would develop a counterterrorist messaging plan.

“We need to prepare for an information attack,” Abdullayev announced in Russian, his words promptly translated into English and Dari. “We have a lot of work to do.”

Benefits of the exercise
Col. Kanat Azhtanov, the Kazakh lead planner for RC 13, said years of participation in the exercise have given officers real-world expertise in handling a multinational coalition of Soldiers and civilians. He invited other countries to join the exercise in the future.

“It would be real positive if more nations participated. It would build trust between countries,” Azhtanov said. “Disasters can happen in other countries as well — not just Kazakhstan.”

Having attended several Regional Cooperation exercises over the years, Maj. Gen. Jalandar Shah Behnam, Afghanistan’s chief representative at the 2013 gathering, noted that the proficiency level continues to grow.
“The exercise has two benefits: The first is national and the second is regional,” Behnam said. “It helps us coordinate with neighboring countries to deal with human trafficking, counternarcotics, counterterrorism and border issues we may have.”

Touring the training center several days into RC 13, Maj. Gen. Robert Catalanotti, U.S. Central Command’s director of exercises and training, told participants that such cooperation is a vehicle to keep lines of communication open even when political relationships have frayed.
“The military-to-military engagement throughout the world between the United States and Central Asia is the best it’s ever been,” Catalanotti said.

Countering propaganda
As the exercise progressed, intelligence and counterpropaganda units got a better grip on the terrorists who were using the natural disaster to spread further confusion.

Beamed into the training center were realistic-looking Russian language newscasts featuring live reporters and graphic imagery of the chemical-plant bomb attack and emergency workers in yellow hazardous-materials suits.
Another chilling message arrived not long thereafter: A train had exploded — presumably the work of the AUB — exposing 50,000 people to a burst of chlorine gas.

Though still expending most of its energies on relieving the injured and homeless, the Regional Coordination Center produced photographic slides identifying the leadership of the AUB and tracked the group’s sources of financing.

The Afghan analysts in the Information Operations Group had learned that terrorist recruitment was focusing on the disaster-zone population and vulnerable young males. Young women lured to the group with the promise of honest work were being forced into sexual servitude. Terrorists disseminated their messages using a variety of outlets that included an AUB website, cellphone transmissions and leaflets.

The information team was ordered to respond. Using a Russian-language script, the team recorded a counterpropaganda video in which a government spokesperson reassured the population.

Nevertheless, the team was instructed not to give all terrorist propaganda equal weight. Not every bit of misinformation was worth refuting. They had to choose which battles to fight.

“Sometimes silence is golden,” said U.S. Lt. Col. Mark Mauri, a counterpropaganda specialist who helped design the AUB scenario. “You don’t want to legitimize every piece of propaganda with a response.”

A successful event
As is often the case with an exercise operating under deliberate constraints set by the organizers, participants expressed frustration that they couldn’t do more to thwart the AUB, that they couldn’t issue orders to mobilize forces to confront the terrorists.

But organizers noted that the training objectives — above all, saving the lives of disaster victims — were meant to increase the capabilities of troops not always comfortable working with their foreign counterparts.

Planners envision a larger role in future exercises for counterterrorism and counterpropaganda, including the growing field of cyber security.

“It’s real important to include terrorism in the scenario. It’s a fact of life in our region and causes instability,” Kazakhstan’s Col. Azhtanov said. “Including terrorist acts in the exercise gets us close to real life.”