Countering the Chameleon

By learning how extremists adapt to countermeasures, militaries can prepare for future threats

UNIPATH STAFF

Had it succeeded, the operation would have killed thousands and destroyed large sections of Amman. Al-Qaida-linked terrorists had spent months smuggling explosives, mortars and machine guns out of conflict-wracked Syria and into Jordan. As they built up their weapons cache, they emailed al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) bomb-makers, seeking technical advice on rigging explosives for maximum carnage. Based on their guidance, they experimented with new, highly destructive techniques. The group even posted its results online for others to follow. They surveyed attack sites in Jordan’s capital city, focusing on shopping malls, neighborhoods and embassies, targeting citizens and foreigners alike.

But even as the militants plotted, Jordanian intelligence agents were watching. The directorate “had all their activities under surveillance,” said Samih Maayta, a Jordanian Ministry of Information spokesman. The agency arrested the group in October 2012 as it began to recruit operatives to conduct the attacks, which would have included car bombs, suicide bombs and guerrilla-style assaults.

A learning enemy
The failed plot reveals several key aspects of al-Qaida’s triple transformation from a ragtag band of ideologues in the 1980s to a top-down, tightly controlled bureaucracy in the 1990s and its current status as a loose federation of franchises linked by the Internet. Al-Qaida’s new modus operandi has allowed the organization to be resilient while under constant attack and continue waging its global campaign of violence, terror and propaganda. The group also offers a troubling model for other violent extremists.

This evolution shows why security affairs specialist Richard Shultz calls al-Qaida “a ‘learning’ enemy” that constantly seeks strategic, operational and tactical solutions for the challenges it faces. “An understanding of how such organizations ‘think’ and ‘plan’ at the strategic level is necessary in order to be better prepared for future threats,” he explains.

A weakened al-qaida
After a decade of relentless pursuit and near-continuous loss of key personnel, culminating with the death of Osama bin Laden, al-Qaida’s previous ability to plan and execute attacks has been crippled. But the group compensated for its diminished capacity by seeking independent local partners that would embrace its ideology and join the cause of global terrorism.

“Affiliates offer al-Qaida many practical rewards: hundreds or even thousands of fighters, donors, smuggling networks and sympathetic preachers who offer religious legitimacy,” notes security expert Daniel Byman.

The franchises may get funding — when it’s available — along with the al-Qaida brand, however tarnished it may be. But the biggest plus is that it gives small local organizations the potential to assume an inflated importance and credibility.

“Al-Qaida has become a useful label for any group that essentially pursues local aims but wishes to exaggerate its reach and sophistication,” said Richard Barrett, coordinator of the U.N.’s al-Qaida–Taliban Monitoring Team.

While this strategy provides flexibility for al-Qaida, it also highlights an inherent weakness: the inability to control its satellites.  AQI, for example, one of the first franchises to emerge from al-Qaida’s decentralization, conducted massive suicide bombings as part of its campaign to ignite sectarian strife in that country. By killing and wounding thousands of innocent Muslims, however, the group and its core leadership were reviled and rejected. In 2005, security officials uncovered a letter from Ayman al-Zawahiri to AQI leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi that chastised the Iraqi affiliate for its brutality. Zawahiri warned that such actions drove a dagger into al-Qaida’s campaign to win Iraqi hearts and minds.

Exploiting instability
Al-Qaida was eager to attempt regeneration and “rebranding” after the Arab Awakening. By seizing on regional upheaval and resulting lapses in security capabilities, the group and its affiliates were able to take over a number of “ungoverned spaces” that emerged after the turmoil began, creating new safe havens and bases from which to operate.

In Iraq, for example, despite enormous pressure and decimation of its senior leadership, AQI is attempting a comeback. Taking advantage of recent instability there, the group has set up training camps in the nation’s western deserts and more than doubled its numbers between 2011 and 2012.

One AQI cell is thought to have migrated to Syria, where, disguised as Jabhat al-Nusra, it is exploiting the violence that has engulfed the country and trying to infiltrate the revolution there. Although currently small in size, the Nusra group packs a disproportionate wallop due to its bomb-making and suicide operations experience.

In North Africa, al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) hijacked a tribal rebellion in northern Mali to become the de facto rulers of the lawless state, creating a safe haven from which they hope to extend their influence. The group, which got its start as a criminal organization kidnapping foreigners for profit before merging with al-Qaida in 2007, had increased its firepower with weapons obtained during Libya’s collapse.

Experts say that similar scenarios may emerge across Africa and the Middle East as turmoil in Iraq, Libya, Nigeria, Somalia and Syria gives Islamists an opportunity to exploit chaos and unrest.

Internet propaganda
Al-Qaida maintains its core identity on the Internet, where blogs, interactive websites and social media allow both leadership and affiliates to recruit, proselytize and raise funds. Chat rooms, which often are trolled for potential recruits, can be particularly valuable: If an individual seems to be a likely candidate, he can receive follow-up emails that encourage further contact. This cyber- mobilization strategy has served as a model for other extremist groups, most of which have also crafted an online presence.

Al-Qaida and other extremists also use the Internet to post fundraising appeals on their websites. “Many mujahedeen sit and wait and cannot fight for lack of supplies,” pleaded al-Qaida finance chief Mustafa Abu al-Yazid in a 2009 fundraising video. But international crackdowns on money laundering, charity fraud, hawala and other forms of terrorist financing have reduced the value of such tactics.

Drugs and kidnapping
As a result, al-Qaida affiliates have been forced to find local self-funding solutions. This means a greater reliance on crime — particularly drug trafficking and kidnapping — to provide cash flow.
With its experience in kidnapping, for example, AQIM has pulled in as much as $90 million in ransoms during the past decade. Other franchises turn to extortion, black market schemes, arms smuggling, human trafficking and other criminal activities.

The biggest moneymaker, however, remains drug trafficking — mostly Afghan heroin — for core al-Qaida and affiliates around the world. Profit from the drug trade also funds the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Future Trends
Experts agree that al-Qaida is now a decentralized federation, but agree on little else. Some believe that the steady loss of top leadership and events following the Arab Awakening have damaged the group’s legitimacy and sent the organization into a downward spiral. Others see its tentacles continuing to spread an “arc of instability” across Africa, the Middle East and Asia.

Either way, it seems fairly certain that the organization will continue to seek ways to spread its violent message and use every means at its disposal to raise money.

Mobile Banking
As the law-enforcement noose has tightened and choked off sources of funding, some analysts think that al-Qaida and its associates will move away from cash transactions and seek alternative, largely electronic fundraising and money-transfer methods. These include credit card fraud, identity theft and, most recently, mobile banking.

Mobile banking is an emerging technology that lets anyone, with or without a bank account, use a cellphone to transfer money and/or receive payments, even in areas that have no banking facilities. It’s becoming increasing popular in underdeveloped and ungoverned parts of the world — exactly the places terrorists like to hide. Because the process is almost completely unregulated, mobile banking virtually guarantees exploitation.

Cyber Mobilization
Al-Qaida knows that its future depends on the ability to recruit new members. This means that its use of cyber-mobilization techniques will increase, especially as technology advances. As they continue to expand and adapt their networks through social media and the like, the ability to disrupt or degrade their efforts will become much more complex and multilayered.

“If these trends are extrapolated out to 2025,” says counterterrorism specialist Rick Nelson, “it seems inevitable that terrorist groups will have access to more powerful technological tools than they do today. This means that large- and medium-sized terrorist networks will likely see their ability to communicate, train, gather intelligence, organize or collaborate and carry out attacks improve. … Technology may also enhance the capabilities of small cells and even individuals to organize organically or to act alone.”

Looking Ahead
While al-Qaida’s network of affiliates challenges regional security efforts, its inherent weaknesses also offer opportunities for counterterrorism that, if enacted, could help prevent problems.
Deny available safe havens: Work with partners and international governing bodies to prevent extremist groups from carving out new bases from which to operate. Additionally, create incentives and promote conditions to help local populations reject the presence of terrorists or the activities that support them.

Apprehend leadership: Pursuing denial of leadership requires intensive collaboration and information sharing among different national and international intelligence agencies. Strategies could include coordinating with law-enforcement and local officials, while simultaneously addressing key drivers that lead to recruitment. Targeting key opinion leaders — especially in the cyber realm — will help prevent coordination between militant groups and weaken al-Qaida’s ability to function as an international movement.

Disrupt terrorist funding: Law-enforcement agencies, financial authorities and banks should cooperate to subject electronic and cellphone monetary transactions to regulation and monitoring for illicit transactions — while respecting appropriate legal privacy safeguards.

Refute the narrative: Empower those willing to combat terrorist leaders and facilitators in chat rooms and on websites.

Strengthen regional security: Countries that lack large defense budgets will become increasingly vulnerable to armed insurgencies unless more advantaged countries assist those most at risk. Leaders must work together to share resources and information, as well as initiate joint training and operations to defeat terrorism and ensure a peaceful future.

Sources: BBC; Center for Strategic and International Studies; CNN; Combating Terrorism Center at West Point; The Economist; Foreign Policy; The Independent (London); Joint Special Operations University; The Long War Journal; The National Interest; The New York Times; Penn State Journal of International Affairs; Reuters; SAS Institute, Inc.; SmartWar.org; Strategic Studies Institute; The Telegraph (London); United Press International; The Washington Times

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What are your thoughts?

We want to hear what you think are the best ways to counter extremist organizations.

• What changes in extremist tactics have you observed?
• What emerging trends do you think extremists could exploit to their advantage?
• What strategies do you think best counter their plans and tactics?

Send us your thoughts at: unipath@centcom.mil.